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This Policy Brief was produced by
the African Development Bank Secretariat1. Weathering the Storm
The global economy continues to grapple
with the impact of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis, with global output growth in
2009 estimated to contract to about 0.5%,
its lowest pace since World War II(1).
Africa’s economic growth is expected to
follow suit, declining to 3.4% in 2009 from
5.2% in 2008. This sharp global economic
downturn has led to an immense contrac-
tion in international trade. Growth in
export volumes on the continent is expec-
ted to decrease to 3.6% in 2009 from a
buoyant rate of 10.6% in 2008, translating
into a loss in export value of 45.4%
(Figure 1). In countries such as South
Africa, export growth declined from a
buoyant 7.5% in 2007 to 2.1% in 2008
and it is expected to worsen to -1.4% in
2009(2) .
Liquidity constraints in the financial mar-
kets have also translated into a lack of
credit for trade finance. Given that 60% of
trade finance is handled by private agents
and 90% of the US$ 14 trillion worth of
global trade is financed by trade credits,
further tightening of markets has dire
consequences on trade performance. The
WTO estimates that liquidity shortages
and disproportionate aversion to risk have
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Source: African Development Bank estimates; World Economic Situation and Prospects, Unctad, January 2009
(1)International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2009.
(2)National Treasury of South Africa, Budget Review, February 2009.caused a shortfall in available trade finan-
ce of about US$25 billion, disrupting trade
and growth performance, and possibly
exacerbating the effects of the crisis.
Liquidity shortage has also affected trade
in services, particularly due to declining
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as inves-
tors retrieve their capital from emerging
markets(3), with developing countries
being the most affected. Egypt, for
example, recorded a fall in FDI of about
44% in December 2008(4). Africa’s tou-
rism has also not been spared by the
effects of the global financial crisis.
Globally, tourism figures are expected to
stagnate in 2009 although a decline of up
to about 2.1% is predicted, depending on
the magnitude of the global contraction(5).
The growth rates of international arrivals
to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008 have alrea-
dy shrunk to 4.2% from 7.5% in 2007.
Seychelles, Cape Verde and Mauritius are
among the hardest hit, given that tourism
receipts are greater than 20% of GDP in
each of these countries.
The full impact of the financial crisis is still
uncertain and countries will continue to
navigate in uncharted waters. The major
concern for African countries is the poten-
tial adverse impacts on major economic
activities in the areas of trade and invest-
ment, which are feared could compromise
gains already made towards poverty
reduction and other development goals.
It is clear that solutions must entail inter-
vention beyond national borders if they
are to be effective and sustainable,
making international coordination a vital
step. From an African perspective therefo-
re, a key question is: what should the
continent expect from the G20? With its
representation comprising countries from
the developed and developing world, the
G20 offers a unique opportunity to table
practical solutions that are holistic and
inclusive. To begin with, the specific cir-
cumstances of the developing world must
be articulated in the G20’s engagement in
major discussions. The G20 can support
African countries by ensuring that develo-
ped countries refrain from protectionism in
responding to the crisis, and to adopt
approaches that are inclusive, given the
contagious nature of the problem. It is
also critical that the G20 makes a firm
commitment to conclude the Doha
Development Round and to support the
Aid for Trade agenda. African countries
must also recognize that the goodwill from
the G20 can only go so far. The onus is
on them to craft short- and long-term stra-
tegies that can boost trade as a tool to
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(3) Estimates by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
(4)African Development Bank, Trade, Investment and Domestic Resource Mobilization”, Background Paper presented at the C10
meeting in South Africa, January 2009.
(5) World Tourism Organization, January 2009.drive the development agenda. This
includes pursuing domestic trade policy
reforms that support international rules
(simplification, harmonization and stan-
dardization of rules, procedures and pro-
cesses), unlocking opportunities in the
regional agenda, and increasing their
voice and participation in the Doha
Development Round. All these actions will
come at a cost and will require financing.
As such, it is critical for Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs) to come up
with innovative instruments to support the
adjustment process in Africa.
2. What can the G20 do?
2.1 The G20: Alleviating Fears
of Protectionism
Responses to the current economic crisis
are now about preserving jobs and coun-
tries are using every available instrument
to minimize economic distress. History
testifies to the natural tendency for increa-
sed protectionism during economic crisis,
particularly in industrial goods. Protection
can take several forms, including tariffs,
subsidies and trade remedies (safe-
guards, countervailing measures or safe-
guards). The 1930s should continue to
serve as a reminder of how protectionism
almost led to the demise of free trade,
worsening the effects of the great depres-
sion. Similarly, during the Asian crisis, the
number of anti-dumping investigations
was the highest between 1996 and 1998
in products ranging from base metals,
glass, textiles and machinery(6). It is the-
refore important that countries find a
balance between the use of tools that
minimize the damage to the workforce
while at the same time avoiding beggar-
thy-neighbour policies or violating global
trade rules.
So far, evidence of the use of glaring
trade protectionist measures remains limi-
ted. However, there are some countries
which have introduced support and impo-
sed higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers or
trade remedies. Most notable is the
United States through massive support to
its banks and other financial institutions,
and to specific industries such as the
automobile sector. Another notable instan-
ce since early this year is the European
8QLRQ¶Vre-introduction of export
subsidies for butter, cheese and milk
(whole and skim milk powder). Develo-
ping countries such as India and those of
Latin America have also followed suit by
protecting some specific products, but it is
uncertain as to where all of this is taken
us in terms of free trade, given the magni-
tude of the protectionist measures sum-
marized in Table 1.
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(6)N. Joubert, N., (2005) “The Reform of SouthAfrica’sAnti-Dumping Regime,” In Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation
(Low, P. and A. Stoler, eds), UK: Cambridge University Press.These selected examples illustrate that
the fears of a global return to protectio-
nism are indeed real. Given that the
European Union and the United States
are key markets, especially for Africa,
escalating levels of protection on key agri-
cultural and industrial products of interest
to the continent raises a serious concern.
It is therefore timely that the G20 make
concerted efforts to communicate these
fears to policy-makers, the private sector
and other stakeholders, and articulate the
detrimental effects that increased protec-
tion would have on fragile African econo-
mies during these turbulent times.
2.2 The G20 in International Trade
Support Frameworks
The Doha Development Round – The
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is an
opportunity to improve global growth pros-
pects from which all economies and
societies can benefit. Most importantly,
the negotiations offer a chance for Africa
to catch up with other competitors by loc-
king-in domestic or unilateral reforms and
getting other countries to open up to their
exports and thereby levelling the playing
field with key competitors. DDA’s failure to
meet its objectives does not only undermi-
ne the importance of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), but it will also jeo-
pardize trade and growth prospects of
developing economies, with Africa clearly
standing out among the biggest losers.
With agricultural issues being central to
the successful completion of the DDA,
Africa should continue to push for more
progress on agriculture’s three main
contentious issues: (i) agricultural tariffs;
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Financial support to the banking Industry and automobile industry
(i) Re-introducing export subsidies for butter, cheese and whole and skim milk powder
from January 2009
(ii) Support the auto industry – France, Germany
Introduced measures to support domestic car manufacturers including state subsidies,
and in January raised import duties on cars and trucks
Aid package of short-term loans to the auto industry
Planning to set up a A$2 billion fund to provide liquidity to car dealer financiers
Increased tariffs on some steel products in November 2008
Tariffs on imports of crude oil will increase from 1 per cent to 3 percent in March 2009
Restricted the entry points for imports, such as electronics, garments, toys, footwear,
and food and beverages to only five ports and certain international airports since
December 2008
Imposed non-automatic licensing requirements on products considered as sensitive,
such as auto parts, textiles, TVs, toys, shoes, and leather goods
Members have proposed to raise their common external tariff by 5 per cent on avera-
ge, on a number of specific items, including wine, peaches, dairy products, textiles,
leather goods and wood furniture. Waiting for ratification
Source: World Trade Organization, JOB(09)/2, January 2009(ii) the trade distorting and domestic sup-
port developed countries provide to their
farmers; and (iii) export subsidies. The
leadership role of the G20 cannot be
timelier in ensuring the advancement of
progress on these issues.
It is clear that the magnitude of economic
gains that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
stands to make from the Doha Round is
significant, although they remain a conjec-
ture. The World Bank projects that SSA
would see a modest US$4.8 billion increa-
se in merchandise trade (some 1.1% of
the region’s GDP), with agriculture
accounting for 78% of the total gain for
SSA(7). African cotton farmers are likely
to boost their exports by US$1.9 billion. A
more ambitious target of full merchandise
trade liberalisation, with a supportive
domestic policy environment, is estimated
to result in gains of approximately 5% of
income in developing countries, which
would lift some 300 million people out of
poverty by 2015. If a greater opening of
the services trade were to occur, the
benefits would be substantially greater.
Should it accrue, such benefits will be
unmatched by all other international eco-
nomic cooperation, neither debt relief nor
official development assistance. It is the-
refore critical that the G20 reaffirms its
commitment to ensuring that these poten-
tial gains are realized.
Aid for Trade Initiative – Trade liberalisa-
tion alone is not enough. Trade barriers
have come down a great deal, but trade
performance in most African countries has
not improved. Other factors such as
investment opportunities, transport infra-
structure, customs and ports reforms,
competition policy, skills and macro-eco-
nomic policies are also crucial for the suc-
cess of efforts at scaling up trade in the
region and the rest of the world. These
reforms will require adjusting financing on
which countries strongly rely on Aid for
Trade. Under the WTO’s leadership, signi-
ficant progress has been made in mobili-
zing Aid for Trade, with a clear commit-
ment from the international community.
However, it is important that Aid for Trade
be driven not only by donors and the
international community. African countries
should also be proactive in designing a
coherent set of policy options targeted to
their own development objectives.
The Aid for Trade initiative must also com-
plement and strengthen Africa’s regional
integration efforts, particularly increasing
the level of intra-African trade among
others. This leaves a clear role for Pan-
African institutions such as the African
Development Bank (AfDB) Group; the
African Union Commission (AUC) and the
United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UN-ECA) to ensure their promi-
nence in this process. Through its increa-
sed focus on both physical infrastructure
and private sector development, the AfDB
recognizes its important financing role in
Aid for Trade.
5
(7)Global Monitoring Report, 2006.The G20, for its part, should continue to
recognize that it takes decades to build
productive capacity that is effective and
sustainable. Aid for Trade therefore needs
to involve long-term, predictable aid flows
which can be fed into budgeting pro-
cesses. More importantly, Aid for Trade
must be a complement, not a substitute,
for working towards a more progressive
world trading system; one which does not
prejudice the interests of developing
countries.
3. The G20 and Africa’s Trade
Liberalisation Strategies
African countries now strongly recognize
the need to include the trade agenda in
their medium and long-term strategies to
boost trade performance and, conse-
quently, economic growth. For most
African countries, however, the challenge
is to determine the priorities in trade poli-
cy, and give them prominence among the
competing demands in unilateral, regional
and multilateral trade agendas. Improving
Africa’s trade prospects will, therefore,
require concerted efforts at the national,
regional and international levels.
Gains from international trade will be sub-
stantial only if countries carry out national-
ly- championed unilateral trade reforms,
which could be used to inform multilateral,
regional and preferential processes. Also,
beyond tariff policies as instruments for
liberalization, success depends on com-
plementary improvements in the macroe-
conomic environment by addressing sup-
ply-side issues relating to the provision of
adequate physical and soft infrastructure
and communication, as well as develo-
ping targeted investment policies to sup-
port export diversification and access to
finance.
Liberalising South-South trade should not
be neglected, as 40% of exports from
developing countries go to other develo-
ping countries. Trade barriers by low-inco-
me countries against other low-income
countries significantly impact their own
development, and can be more harmful
than those imposed by rich countries. For
example, Latin American exporters of
manufactured goods face tariffs in neigh-
bouring Latin American markets that are
seven times higher than those they face
in industrialised countries. In Africa’s
case, the average tariff rate is about 19%,
which is still higher than the global tariff
peak which stands at 15%. This results in
developing countries foregoing enormous
market opportunities. Therefore, ensuring
effective export growth for African coun-
tries requires that the issue of trade bar-
riers by both developed and developing
countries be jointly addressed.
4. The Role of the African
Development Bank
The G20 has called upon the international
community to empower MDBs to help
countries cushion the impact of the global
financial crisis. The African Development
Bank recognizes the need for it to act
6promptly in order to help mitigate the
impact of the financial crisis and avoid
“reverse development” in its regional
member countries (RMCs).
The Bank and other MDBs can help
African countries through short-term tar-
geted interventions with a deliberate
move to mitigate procyclicality. Two impor-
tant targets that are within the reach of
MDBs are: offsetting the decline in
government revenues linked to falling
trade volume, and compensating the
decline in loanable funds in the banking
sector. Budget support to governments
and the provision of support to commer-
cial and development banks are, in parti-
cular, recognized responses to these
concerns. The Bank is strengthening its
lines of credit and financing innovative
projects in support of long-term private
sector lending, and has initiated a process
of establishing a trade finance facility to
address issues resulting from liquidity
constraints. Further undertakings by the
Bank and other MDBs include efforts to
establish an Emergency Liquidity Facility,
and the Fragile States Facility which has
been operational since 2008. The Bank
will continue to relentlessly support trade
facilitation activities through its commit-
ment to focus on infrastructure investment
and regional integration, which have the
long-term objective of enhancing competi-
tiveness as emphasized in Bank’s
Medium Term Strategy.
The Bank is also committed to supporting
African countries in strengthening their
voice and participation with a view to
achieving a successful conclusion of the
Doha Round, and encouraging solid
domestic reforms that are not subject to a
policy reversal. These activities will be
accomplished through collaborative activi-
ties with UNECA, the WTO and other
regional and international partners.
5. Conclusion
The global slowdown threatens to erode
Africa’s recent economic progress, and
the G20 has a stake in ensuring that
African countries do not retrogress in the
development process. The use of protec-
tionist trade measures that contradict the
rules governing global systems should, in
particular, be avoided. This would regret-
tably undermine the substantial process
that has already made in the Doha
Development Round. In April 2009, the
G20 will be challenged to demonstrate
strong leadership in order to give new
impetus to the Doha trade negotiations so
as to reach conclusions that offer coun-
tries better market access opportunities
as the stormy weather recedes. These
efforts should be complemented by revita-
lized support for the Aid for Trade initiative
needed to address supply-side constraints
to support the trade liberalization agenda.
African countries, for their part, must
continue to deepen their unilateral trade
reforms and strengthen the regional agen-
da to make the most of the full benefits of
free trade. The African Development
Bank remains committed to supporting
these processes.
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Table 1: Trade Prospects
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